The death penalty and the Principle of Goodness by House, Ron
The Death Penalty and the Principle of Goodness
Author
Ron House.
Faculty of Sciences, University of Southern Queensland.
Email: house@usq.edu.au
Mail: Faculty of Sciences,
University of Southern Queensland,
Darling Heights
Australia. 4350
Length
5,200 words
Biographical
Ron House is a lecturer at the University of Southern Queensland and is the 
primary discoverer of the new ethical theory, the Principle of Goodness. Along 
with Gitie House, he has developed the Principle for two decades and has 
presented papers on it since 2005.
This is an electronic version of an article published in The International 
Journal of Human Rights, Volume 13, Issue 5 December 2009 , pages 680 – 
688. The International Journal of Human Rights is available online at: 
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all?content=10.1080/136429
80802533224
1
The Death Penalty and the Principle of Goodness
Abstract
The death penalty question is often framed in utilitarian terms of net balance: 
rights of victims vs rights to life of the convicted. This paper examines the 
issue from the perspective of the new ethical theory, the Principle of 
Goodness. At first sight, the Principle seems to be a strictly tighter moral 
principle than Kant’s categorical imperative; yet we find that the application 
diverges from the recommendations of Kant in this case. Unlike many 
discussions of this question, which often argue either no, or yes with a 
discussion of which crimes are ‘bad enough’ to deserve the penalty, we find 
that the ethical guidance from this Principle allows one to either argue for no 
death penalty, or for a death penalty, the conditions for its application being 
remarkably clear compared with much contemporary and historical argument; 
further, it upholds the right to life for all to the maximum extent that is 
consistent with a person’s own free choices. It will be assumed that the reader 
is familiar with a range of existing argument on the topic, and the paper will 
develop its own theme with contrast where necessary against Kant’s 
principles and utilitarian-style arguments of the kind that arose from that 
philosophy’s social policy origins.
1 Introduction
The right to life is perhaps the foundational human right; but like all rights, it 
is not absolute, if for no other reason than that no consistent philosophy of law 
or social policy can be formulated that always and everywhere preserves all 
human life. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the extent of, and the 
means of preserving, the right to life as it is implicated in the logic and 
justifications for or against the death penalty from the perspective of one 
particular ethical theory, namely the Principle of Goodness (House and House 
2006b). Therefore the primary thrust here is an argument de novo, as there is 
no previous paper on this topic. However, just as the new ethical theory has 
both similarities and contrasts with previous ethical theories, so, too, the 
analysis of a specific ethical question must have such comparisons, and it is 
therefore necessary to devote at least some space to discussing those. 
Further, although this is intended to be a foundational enquiry from basic 
philosophical principles, this topic is so hotly debated that it will be necessary 
to include at least a brief discussion of contemporary viewpoints, if only to 
situate the philosophical considerations. But it is no part of the purpose here 
to attempt a complete coverage of so huge a field.
1.1 Brief Introduction to the Principle of Goodness
The Principle is introduced and discussed in the papers listed in the 
References by this author. It is a realist theory, positing that there are two 
realities, good and evil, which may be described as follows:
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Goodness is to attempt to benefit everyone;
evil is to attempt to harm any innocent one.
We can easily identify some salient characteristics of this theory. Firstly, it is a 
competitor to utilitarianism and all other consequentialist ethical theories in 
the sense that it delivers alternative definitions of these key ethical terms. As 
consequentialism must surely also be a realist theory, and as the above 
definition is obviously at variance with any theory that attempts to maximise 
any measure, the two are incompatible and (under their common assumption 
that ethics is real) at least one must be wrong.
Secondly, we may compare with Kant’s categorical imperative, and we note 
immediately that the Principle of Goodness is a stricter, yet compatible, 
theory: compatible because [Kant] insists that we must act so as to accord 
with a general rule, and the Principle of Goodness is a general rule (or 
becomes one as soon as we say “act such as to avoid evil and pursue 
goodness”); stricter because not any general rule satisfies the Principle.1
[House 2005] in part compares the Principle with utilitarianism.2 In brief, both 
ethical theories recognise that the world is inherently imperfect: we shall 
never be able to act such as to ensure optimally beneficial outcomes for 
everyone without exception. Both theories must accommodate this deficiency 
of our universe. Utilitarianism says “therefore, do the best you can—actually 
achieve the best available outcome given your opportunities, resources, skills, 
knowledge, and so on.” But the Principle of Goodness says “therefore, 
continue to pursue the goal of optimally benefiting everyone, but recognise 
that you might fail; your duty, therefore, is, not to actually benefit everyone, 
but to attempt to benefit everyone.”
Although a great deal of ethical discussion concerns the nature of terms such 
as “benefit”, and whether benefit is synonymous with happiness (or absence of 
misery, etc. etc.), it is not the prime discriminator between the Principle and 
consequentialist ethics. This is a secondary problem whose nature changes 
with our knowledge, understanding, and wisdom. The primary discriminator is 
whether we accept the ethic of being obliged to actually achieve the best 
outcome possible, or of attempting to achieve the optimal outcome. Although 
this paper does not delve into that issue, it must be recognised in order to 
understand the different approach towards a practical issue (here, the death 
penalty).
Another important characteristic of the Principle is that there is a realm of 
non-morally significant action. Many actions are undertaken with neither any 
attempt to cause harm nor any attempt to benefit everyone, and are therefore 
neither proscribed nor recommended.
1 Kant’s over-wide principle causes problems for his philosophy, such as those discussed in 
[Cicovacki].
2 For an account of the prototypical utilitarian analysis of our question, see [Bedau].
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2 Concrete Rules from Abstract Principles
2.1 Sources of Considerations
To derive concrete recommendations or guidance from an abstract principle, 
there must be ways in which the properties of the abstraction intersect with 
the needs of the concrete application. In the case of normative ethics, these 
typically manifest as reasons for the punishment in the sense of justifications. 
Such reasons typically include:
1 obtaining or restoring justice,
2 deterrence,
3 rehabilitation,
4 protection of the community.
They are also affected by reasons of sentiment, such as:
a) repentance,
b) mercy,
c) popular sentiment,
d) victims’ wishes3.
Then there are reasons of pragmatism, most importantly
I. precaution against irreversibility, in case the convicted is actually innocent; 
and also
II. whether a certain punishment violates a human right.
None of these are simple factors, and any of them can interact. For example, a 
crime committed under duress will be evaluated differently from the 
perspective of pure justice, as well as obtaining different effects in popular 
sentiment and victims’ reactions to sentencing.
2.2 Development of the Abstract Ethics
To see how the Principle of Goodness can speak to some or all factors such as 
those listed here, we must first consider the kind of reasoning that the 
Principle typically promotes.
In the first place, it is very easy to see that the Principle implies a hierarchy of 
rights where those of the involved moral agents conflict, such that:
• The rights of the innocent trump the rights of the guilty.
This is because one may not deliberately harm an innocent, but one may do so 
to the guilty. This concerns guilt or innocence in context, not in general. For 
3 In addition, illegitimate factors such as race are sometimes either alleged or actually 
practised, but for our current purposes we may set such factors aside.
4
example, one might be guilty of failing to pay postage on a letter, but this 
would not grant someone the right to use you as a human shield against an 
armed terrorist with whom you had no involvement. But, one might argue, if 
you conspired to arm that terrorist and someone was now going to be shot, it 
should be you rather than anyone uninvolved in the happenings. Now there 
can be, of course, no expectation that every reader will agree with this, so the 
proposition is advanced only as something that the Principle of Goodness 
clearly entails.
As an aside, once guilt and innocence are understood in context in the way 
such considerations imply, we may see further consequences, for example, in 
the treatment of prisoners. If a just sentence has been passed upon a 
convicted person, then, as far as the prison authorities are concerned, outside 
the scope of administering the sentence, nothing remains of the prisoner’s 
guilt, and so the prisoner is to be regarded as innocent. Thus they must be 
protected against assault and sexual crimes within the prison, must not be 
maltreated, and so on. This would surely be a basic human right. That it 
follows so surely from the Principle is encouraging and should assist in 
overcoming apathy towards the human rights of prisoners. The positive 
(goodness) part of the Principle also implies that opportunities for 
rehabilitation and self-improvement should be available, since doing good is 
not limited only to the innocent, but also includes the guilty. Whilst many 
accept such recommendations, the point to note here is that they follow from 
a reasonable consideration of this basic ethical principle.
Also, we may straightforwardly show that:
• The Principle reasonably implies the need for a justice principle.
This follows once one introduces the concept of society. Personal safety is 
essential to operate at all in a community, and cooperation and community-
based actions are, as a practical matter pertaining to the exigencies of human 
life, necessary if there is to be any great likelihood of success in one’s 
attempts to benefit everyone. Although one is not obligated by the Principle to 
succeed, society indirectly incurs the onus of organising itself such as to make 
success (or near-success) as practical as possible. Further, cooperative 
endeavours require contracts, including everything from a business contract, 
to a marriage contract, to informal deals to obtain mutually beneficial action. 
All of these require either or both of a civil and a criminal justice system.
2.3 Connections to the Concrete
Implications of the Principle do not stop there. We may return to the list of 
reasons from justification, sentiment, and pragmatism (again, without 
implying that the lists above are comprehensive). Of our four reasons from 
justification, we have briefly discussed (1), justice; furthermore all but (2), 
deterrence, can be easily related to either protecting innocents or benefiting 
someone, and are therefore admissible. (2) is problematic. With reference to 
the previous discussion of the context of innocence, the question is to what 
extent a guilty person is implicated in similar crimes committed by others. 
Sometimes they clearly are. For example, if a person knows that only one in 
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ten shoplifters are caught, and if the penalty is a fine, then a fine related 
solely to justice would likely be argued to be commensurate with the value of 
goods stolen. But such a shoplifter would clearly see that on average, after 
budgeting for being occasionally caught, shoplifting is nevertheless a 
profitable activity. The innocents (victims of shoplifting) will not be protected 
in such circumstances by a fine that does not take into account the prevalence 
of shoplifting and the need to deter it as a crime overall.
On the other hand, a ”heat of the moment” crime will be undertaken without 
such calculations. It will usually, though, still include a consideration, however 
brief, of the consequences. The thought “Kill him and you’ll hang” can take 
but a moment. So, too, can the thought “Put graffiti on that wall and you’ll 
hang;” yet we can clearly see the difference in the reasonability of using 
hanging as a deterrence to murder versus graffiti. Where does the difference 
come from, according to the Principle of Goodness?
Once again, the difference is found in the context of innocence and guilt. The 
context of graffiti is property damage, not threat to or taking of life (at least, 
not in normal cases). But the context of murder is violence. Where the 
punishment is violent, therefore, a graffitist would be regarded as an innocent 
whereas a murderer would be regarded as guilty.
The context also refers to the chain of causation. The harmful act against the 
guilty must be part of the same chain as the crime for which they are guilty. 
One reason is because the fact that one commits a crime in one circumstance 
does not mean that the same person will commit a similar crime under 
different circumstances. For example, a person might murder an adult, but 
scrupulously refrain from murdering a child; they might even be counted on to 
protect and defend a child against attack, so harming that person for the 
benefit of a child would be (in that context) to harm an innocent.
Another reason is a more subtle interaction between the two parts of the 
Principle: the positive aspect of promoting the benefit of all and the negative 
aspect of avoiding harm to any innocent. Suppose, for example, it is proposed 
to harvest the organs of murderers. Such an act is not at all required to 
punish the murderer, and is performed purely for the localised interests of the 
recipients. To see the problem here, we must understand that deliberately 
causing harm to a criminal as part of a punishment is inherently a failure to 
successfully benefit everyone: this aspect of a justice system is not good in the 
moral sense (according to the Principle), but rather represents failure to find a 
way to promote the good, in light of the acts of the criminal. Pure harm to the 
criminal as part of a just sentence, then, is failure to do good, but is not evil; it 
is a resort to which the criminal’s own acts have forced us. But harvesting the 
criminal’s organs is in intent the gaining of profit from harming the criminal: 
the harm to the criminal is intentional for a self-serving, tainted reason, and is 
not just a failure to find a way to perform good. These consequences follow 
from the fact that the Principle describes states of intention, inner mental 
states of the moral actor, rather than comparisons of outcomes. This is a key 
difference between this moral system and consequentialism: surely any 
consequentialist must say that, given that the harm to the criminal happens 
anyway, putting the wasted organs to use to save another must maximise 
some measure of well-being?
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2.4 Historical Motivations for the Death Penalty
Radelet and Borg provide us with a useful analysis of attitudes towards the 
death penalty. In the early 1970s, the most common argument was general 
deterrence. When studies showed that the deterrent effect was small or 
nonexistent, the argument shifted to incapacitation; that is, by executing 
killers, they are prevented from killing again. This argument in turn failed 
because only about 1% of killers whose sentences were commuted actually did 
kill again, and that figure is almost the same as the number of innocent people 
wrongly sentenced to death. Furthermore, numerous American studies 
showed that for comparable crimes, the death penalty was three to four times 
more likely to be imposed when the victim was black (as opposed to white).
These factors all tell against the death penalty, in practice if not in principle. 
The surprising suggestion that support for the death penalty is symbolic (See 
[Tyler and Weber]) fares no better4. Lately, therefore, the debate has shifted to 
retribution. Whereas the factors listed earlier are all practical, motivated by 
ethics indirectly through the ethical desirability of preventing murders, this 
modern reason is a classic ethically-motivated argument, without an 
intermediate practical step. Walter Berns, for instance, flatly calls modern 
objections to the death penalty “a product of modern amoral political 
philosophy”.
But an argument can easily be made to put the boot on the other foot: it is 
very easy to see that, although enacted equivalent retribution (death for 
death) might be consistent with some ethical principle, it cannot realistically 
be deduced from it, unless one wishes to accept some other conclusions that, I 
think, would be abhorrent to most moderns. For example, if death for death is 
justified by reason of retribution, then should not also terrible torture for 
terrible torture, or horrific mutilation for horrific mutilation, be equally 
entailed? What kind of abhorrent punishment should have been administered 
to some of the twentieth-century mass murderers? Whatever they might 
deserve, would we not prefer that there be some limit to the bestial depths to 
which one would have to fall to deliver retribution to certain criminals? And if 
we stop short of torture or torture-execution, by what principle do we not stop 
short of execution plain and simple?
I shall briefly dispose of one common argument that might be used to mark 
the difference, before assuming that there is none, and that the retribution 
argument fails along with all the others previously mentioned. Perhaps, so one 
might argue, community standards are the thing that determines how far we 
are prepared to go in actually carrying out punishments equivalent to the 
crime? Perhaps as a practical matter it does, but for constructing a sound 
philosophy of human rights, or for obtaining reasoned support for practical 
action for human rights, that is surely an uncomfortable place to be. 
Philosophy, after all, is surely intended to inform and enlighten just those 
community standards, by awakening people to important, yet perhaps subtle, 
ideas and arguments. And human rights, surely, are or should be secure for 
reasons deeper than mere prevailing opinion. To contribute anything useful, 
4 For an argument involving clearly symbolic factors, see [Lehtinen].
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then, the argument must be taken beyond community standards.
So, returning to our theme, if there is a limit to retribution, the Principle of 
Goodness draws it prior to the death penalty, not after, simply because 
comparisons of the numbers of wrongly-executed versus repeating murderers 
do not have the persuasive effect they do in consequentialist ethics. That 
there are any wrongly-executed cannot be sidestepped simply by numbers: 
firstly, it is final and cannot be corrected; and secondly, the wrongly-executed 
are deliberately killed by us (meaning society), whereas we do not commit the 
murders of those who kill again. It is inconsistent to commute all death 
sentences and prevent those who really are killers from killing again; but it is 
not inconsistent to commute all death sentences and attempt to prevent killers 
killing again—and that is all that a Principle concerning mental states 
requires.
3 Breaking Out of Categories
I wish to make a general point here, but one of importance to our topic. 
Namely, that the distinctions amongst various human institutions (in the 
widest sense, including practices, laws, cultural artefacts, etc.) make sense for 
us of the undifferentiated world, but do not always correspond to firm 
boundaries in wider reality. (As we are assuming a realist stance in this paper, 
I do not stop to quibble about the existence of reality here.) To illustrate this 
point, consider the energy that has been devoted over the last few decades to 
whether homosexuality is “a disease”. A careful thinker will easily recognise 
the many levels of confusion inherent in imagining that solving this word 
puzzle makes any difference to the reality of homosexuality as opposed to 
perceptions of it.
Yet this same fallacy is played out repeatedly in the legal system: whether a 
crime is “rape” or “sexual assault”, or whether a killing is “manslaughter”, 
“unlawful killing”, or “murder”. Huge variations occur in punishment 
depending on just which side of a line certain behaviour is deemed to fall. 
Again, this is not an argument that there are no distinctions, just that the 
distinctions are probably much fuzzier, and do not fit in discrete 
compartments. Such considerations might lead us to suspect deficiencies in 
our handling of justice, quite apart from the question of capital punishment.
This leads us to consider the two categories of defence of the populace and 
criminal justice. That they are closely related is seen in the existence of 
‘defence’ reasons for punishment, as discussed previously. Once we recognise 
that these two categories are not entirely separate, perhaps we can advance 
further in arriving at more precisely reasoned arguments for deciding when or 
if to apply the death penalty?
4 A Proposal
If the Principle of Goodness is a genuine foundational ethical principle, it will 
offer moral guidance, but it will not be so specific as to mandate just one 
policy or course of action: conditions change, people’s comfort zones alter, 
understanding grows (in particular, what constitutes benefit and harm), the 
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relative safety of societies differ, and so on. Any worthwhile ethical philosophy 
must be flexible enough to work throughout all these changes and more. This 
means that any specific proposal regarding a given problem most likely cannot 
be deduced from the Principle after the fashion of a mathematical theorem. I 
do not intend, therefore, to justify the following minutely from the Principle. 
However, in the light of the matters discussed so far, the rationale should be 
sufficiently clear.
In summary, some relevant considerations from our discussion are:
• the need to protect every innocent to the best of our abilities;
• innocents include the wrongly convicted and also the innocent victims of 
crime;
• we might need to consider defence of society and the justice system as 
an integrated whole;
• a proposal informed by the Principle of Goodness will include a justice 
principle;
• there is a limit to the extremities to which retribution can be taken, as a 
result of the need to resist falling into savagery.
Here is one proposal that attempts to harmonise these factors.
• The justice system should be reconstructed so as to place obtaining 
truth at the foundation of all its processes. All reliable and relevant 
evidence should be admissible. Guilty verdicts for serious crime should 
only be obtained after the most stringent “quality checks” on the 
reliability of the reasoning. (This might, and perhaps will, require major 
revisions of such things as the jury system.)
• A just sentence for deliberate, unforced, malicious murder of the 
innocent by a competent adult is death. This sentence should be passed 
in all such cases.
• But a civilised society will not itself use violence as retribution; 
therefore all death sentences should be suspended in favour of genuine 
whole-of-life imprisonment. In other words, the death penalty will never 
be used for pure retribution, and should exonerating evidence be 
uncovered, reversal of the verdict and compensation may be possible.
• However, those murderers who are now still alive and capable of further 
acts are still guilty in that capacity (although innocent in the context of 
subject to judicial punishment, as discussed earlier), and their further 
acts in their life form a chain of causation, as discussed above.
• If, therefore, the commuted sentence proves insufficient to stop that 
person from committing serious crimes of violence against innocents 
(for example, they commit further serious violence in prison or after a 
jailbreak, or they commission crimes by outside associates), then the 
sentence will be reinstated and actually carried out—not as retribution, 
but as defence of the innocents in the community who are placed at risk 
by the continued life of the criminal.
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This proposal attempts to protect the innocent, both by keeping alive those 
innocents wrongly convicted, and by protecting future would-be victims by 
making sure that convicted murderers still have “something to lose” by 
committing further crimes. It removes the emotional element from death 
sentence deliberations by passing it upon all who commit those serious crimes 
that merit it by principles of proportional returns, at the same time making it 
clear that the sentence will with certainty be suspended. Only the criminal’s 
own future behaviour, not the uncertain emotions of judges and jurors 
regarding past behaviour, will determine if a death sentence is actually 
carried out. An actual execution is, therefore, the death defence of society, not 
the death penalty. In this respect, it differs from common American practice 
today (for example, see [Reza]).
To see how this proposal acts to everyone’s benefit, it is necessary to first 
stress that the convictions for the original crime and the second crime that 
triggers the actual imposition of the death sentence must be independent. No 
trace of persuasion should be entertained in the second trial on the grounds 
that the defendant, having killed before, is a likely suspect for killing again: 
the proof must be complete in and of itself. If, as mentioned earlier, around 1% 
of convictions are wrongful, then for an innocent to be actually executed, two 
such independent wrongful convictions must have occurred, with a probability 
of around 0.01%, or 1% squared. Taking into account only second or 
subsequent murders (which is surely conservative), the benefit for all of 
clearly laying out such rules in advance (in ignorance of) actual crimes would 
be that everyone’s probability of being the victim of murder is reduced by at 
least some fraction of 1% (the exact number subject to research into 
prevention and deterrence effects) at the cost of a radically smaller 
probability of wrongful conviction. If the deterrent effects of the certain 
knowledge of when the death penalty would be invoked are even as much as, 
say, 2%, then every individual is benefited in the sense of living with a lowered 
probability of harm.
Are there any other situations where actually carrying out the sentence should 
be considered? I believe there is just one: the case where a murder is 
committed to prevent detection or apprehension for another, prior crime. The 
reason is, again, defence of the innocent rather than retribution. A criminal, 
no matter how serious their crimes to date, must still have something to lose 
by committing further crimes to cover up past crimes.
5 Conclusion
As mentioned previously, this proposal is by no means deduced in the pure 
logical sense from the Principle of Goodness, but it is nevertheless strongly 
inspired by it, and relevant connections with the earlier sections of this paper 
will be readily apparent. The clarity of the proposal contrasts strongly with 
existing practice in countries using the death penalty, where emotions, 
outrage, race of the victim, and other illogical factors continue to make the 
death penalty more of a gamble than an element of a decent justice system. 
The right to life may be philosophically absolute, but in practice we have to 
accept that we are not infallible, and mistakes will be made and protections 
will sometimes fail. Much current discussion effectively ‘throws some people 
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away’, either, in the case of death penalty opponents, by arguing that no 
amount of danger and harm to innocents should ever trigger the act against 
the guilty, or by proponents failing to grapple sufficiently with the problem of 
wrongful convictions. The above proposal attempts to protect everyone’s right 
to life, if not absolutely, then at least with probability. This might seem almost 
paradoxical, given the natures of the Principle of Goodness and of prior ethical 
theories such as utilitarianism. But it seems to be the case that the Principle 
works better in practice on utilitarian measures than utilitarianism!
Is there any reason to be found in the nature of the Principle of Goodness, why 
a proposal based upon it has the kind of clarity we have seen in our 
discussion? I believe there is. In any consequentialist ethic, the calculation of 
relative amounts of benefit or harm, happiness or misery, is largely uncertain, 
if not incoherent as a meaningful measure. This opens the door to emotion and 
to bias due to one’s own position as an actor in whatever debate is being 
conducted. And even if one somehow removes all this uncertainty, the 
calculation of future effects of actions and accurate predictions of realised 
amounts of benefit and harm is arguably close to impossible. But the question 
of whether an attempt is being made to harm a single innocent is very much 
less susceptible to such uncertainty, and no prediction of future effects is 
required, as the Principle concerns intention, not outcome. In other words, the 
questions posed by the Principle of Goodness are inherently more securely 
answered than those posed by consequentialist ethics. This is good news, 
because ultimately defending human rights will need sound argument from 
fundamental principles; imprecise and unverifiable ideas like “inherent 
dignity” will not be sufficient.
There are, however, still important questions to be considered. What is 
innocence? What is justice? A great deal of progress in moral argument can be 
made, I believe, without further in-depth analyses of these questions, purely 
owing to the superior clarity of the Principle of Goodness. It remains to be 
seen how much additional progress can be made after further investigations 
such as these are carried out.
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